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the fulness of human personality that we interpret and estimate reality. When we are told, therefore (p. 81), that "in impulse we know reality directly," we need not take the statement too strictly. It has yet to be paraphrased. *All* impulse does not possess this revealing power. The impulse in question must, it appears, be *real*, must be *purposive* and *ideal*, must be "*rational and harmonious*," for, as we are assured (p. 408) (and perhaps rightly), "It is only through the *moral conversion of his will* that man will be enabled even to *understand* the universe." But as to what morality is, if it is to achieve this result, we fail, I fear, to get much light either from the philosopher or from his commentator. There are many glimpses of good and true things in Professor Caldwell's pages, but they would gain infinitely in force by judicious condensation and an effort after coherence in essential principles.

W. WALLACE.

OXFORD.

STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC. By J. M. E. McTaggart, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College in Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1896. Pp. xvi., 259.

To students of Hegel's philosophy, Mr. McTaggart's work needs no recommendation. It is a critical estimate of the nature, validity, and general result of that peculiar process of passing from one idea to another which has come to be commonly known as Hegel's Dialectic Method. And it is, in English at least, the first complete and direct attempt to form such an estimate. Its definiteness and hard-headedness well represent what we might expect to be the characteristic contribution of the Cambridge mind to English idealism. The point on which Mr. McTaggart is undoubtedly successful is his account of the change of method in the dialectic progression, and his explanation of the motive force of the process as "the discrepancy between the concrete and perfect idea implicitly in our minds, and the abstract and imperfect idea explicitly in our minds."

When we come, however, to a further contention in the same context, viz., that the presence of negation in the dialectic is a mere accident, we are in presence of something more doubtful. Mr. McTaggart's whole position begins to dawn upon us. Though he defends Hegel on the whole against Trendelenburg, Seth, and the criticisms implied in Mr. Balfour's stand-point, we are inclined to suspect that something of their spirit has entered into him. We

do not feel that he really cares for "immanence,"—the oneness of thought with sense and experience. We find almost a contradiction in his result, that philosophy can convince us that the world is rational, in the abstract, indeed, but not in every detail. Pain and evil, the time process, the alleged abstractness of mere philosophy, are for him not merely partly resolved appearances, but obstacles which we cannot even begin to transcend in detail.

It is hardly a mere accident that the law of contradiction is stated as if it excluded difference; as if predicates began by being contraries, and could only come together in the same subject by a synthesis which transforms their nature, and somehow abolishes their opposition. But surely it is a pity to state the law of contradiction as "whatever is A, can never at the same time be not A." Every judgment is in the form, A is B. Predicates begin by being differences, and only become contraries under certain conditions. And when those conditions are overcome by explanation or synthesis, they remain differences still, and negatively related, though not incompatible.

The point of this is, for the purpose of this JOURNAL, that it may be doubted whether Mr. McTaggart allows us to be sufficiently in earnest with the relative reality of appearances and details. If pain or imperfection *is*, he seems to say, it is hopeless to get away from it. You can, at best, believe, in general, that the whole may be well. We are reminded of Plato's complaint of those who cut away the stepping-stones between the particular and the universal. All real science rests on gradation.

I am aware that this is a very inadequate notice of a work of singular knowledge and ability. It is only meant to be an indication of the impression which the book made upon me, when considered with reference to ultimate issues. Professor Wallace's review in *Mind* for October, 1896, should be read by those who desire help in appreciating the problems involved.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

ÉTUDES HISTORIQUES SUR L'ESTHÉTIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN. Par Maurice de Wulf, Docteur en Droit, etc. Louvain. Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1896. Pp. 67.

This is one of those productions that add to human ignorance. Since 1879, when the Pope, in his encyclical *Æterni Patris*, wisely recommended to the Church the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas